US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned last year in a leaked classified memo that donors in Saudi Arabia were the "most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide". She said it was "an ongoing challenge" to persuade Saudi officials to treat such activity as a strategic priority. The groups funded include al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, she added. The memo, released by Wikileaks, also criticised efforts to combat militants by the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. Meanwhile, a lawyer for the founder of the Wikileaks website said he was holding back secret material for release* if anything happened to him. He told the BBC that a rape case being prepared in Sweden against Julian Assange, an Australian national, was politically motivated.*File was released by WikiLeaks months ago which is heavily encrytped and was called "Insurance File"
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba "probably raised millions of dollars" annually from Saudi sources, often during the Hajj - and the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, she alleged. Mrs Clinton said reforms to criminalise terrorist financing and restrict the overseas flow of funds from Saudi-based charities had been effective, but that they did not cover equally suspect "multilateral organisations". Another cable alleges that the Pakistani charity Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which has been accused of being a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba, used a Saudi-based front company to fund its activities in 2005. Leaked US diplomatic cable The US embassy in Riyadh said in February that the Saudi authorities remained "almost completely dependent on the CIA" for information.
SECRET SECTION 01 of 03 RIYADH 000182 NOFORN SIPDIS S/SRAP FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE DOHA FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KTFN SA AF PK SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S FEBRUARY 15-16 VISIT TO RIYADH Ref: KABUL 500 RIYADH 00000182 001.2 of 003 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke, Embassy Riyadh warmly welcomes you to Saudi Arabia, which, by virtue of its historical and cultural ties to Central Asia; personal relationships between Saudi, Afghani and Pakistani leaders; financial power; and leadership of the Muslim world, can play a central role in implementing the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Your visit comes at a time of great potential but great uncertainty: the Saudi-Afghan relationship appears to be warming up, while the traditionally close Saudi-Pakistani relationship has grown increasingly strained. The Saudis are broadly supportive of our approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but occasionally express skepticism about our timing or our approach. Your visit provides an opportunity to mine the Saudis' wealth of experience in dealing with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and extremism, and further explore ways to translate our shared goals into action in the unique Saudi context. We have requested meetings with GIP Director Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, and Prince Turki Al-Faisal during your visit. 2. (C) SAUDI-AFGHAN RELATIONS WARMING: President Karzai's February 2-3 visit to the Kingdom, although richer in symbolism than substance, was a sign that lukewarm Saudi-Afghan relations may finally be warming up. In his official statement at the London Conference, FM Saud announced a $150 million pledge of additional financial support for Afghan reconstruction. He expressed broad Saudi support for reconciliation, adding that they would be willing to assist at the request of President Karzai-- on the condition that the Taliban sever its relationship with Al-Qaeda and cease providing refuge to its leaders. While not as forward leaning as we may have liked, FM Saud's statement put the Saudis on the record and created an opportunity to put reconciliation talks back in motion--eventually. Saudi participation at the Turkish-led regional conference on Afghanistan on January 26 was further evidence of the Saudi commitment to engagement. Karzai's visit showed that the King was ready to deal with Karzai as a legitimate, Muslim head of state. However, the Saudis continue to have concerns about Afghan corruption and believe greater political incorporation of the Pashtun community is essential. Their apparent wish to downplay Karzai's visit--as compared to the Afghans (reftel)--may also indicate the King's desire to keep some distance and maintain his credibility as a potential reconciliation mediator. 3. (s/nf) but mediation not ready for prime time: Privately, the Saudis tell us it's still "too soon" to be publicly discussing technical and financial aspects of reintegration efforts. GIP Director Prince Muqrin has made clear that his marching orders are to work through intelligence channels only until progress becomes sustainable, at which point foreign ministries will be brought in. In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, Prince Muqrin hinted at but did not provide details about what appears to be significant movement on the Saudi mediation effort, with visits by high-level Taliban and Afghan officials, since the Hajj. We surmise that Muqrin is reluctant to share information because the talks remain delicate and he fears U.S. involvement could derail progress. He has also voiced concern about how to address UNSCR 1267 prohibitions on dealing with various Taliban members. 4. (C) ZARDARI STILL THE PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN: The Saudis generally agree that there is a need to deny terrorists safehavens in Pakistan, but question whether the methods we have outlined will be effective. Despite tense relations with the Zardari government, close military and intelligence cooperation continues between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Saudis believe opposition leader Nawaz Sharif can play a "great role" in working with tribal chiefs and that "money is better than bullets" in the fight against the Taliban. They have started to fulfill their pledge from the Tokyo donor,s conference (over half of the $700 million pledged has been disbursed) and have expressed a willingness to continue with financial support for a stable Pakistan. Saudi interlocutors stress the importance of remembering that Pakistan remains Riyadh 00000182 002.2 of 003 pre-occupied with issues on its Indian border, coloring its ability to deal with the Taliban. 5. (C) IN THE ARMY WE TRUST: The tumultuous democratic process in Pakistan makes the Saudis nervous, and they appear to be looking for "another Musharraf": a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust. In his January meeting with General Jones, the King cited President Zardari as an impediment to denying terrorist safehavens, calling him an "obstacle" and "a rotten head" that was infecting the whole body. He maintained that the Pakistani Army was capable of being a strong partner for the U.S., and opined that U.S. development assistance would rebuild trust. He asserted that that the Army was staying out of Pakistani politics in deference to U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it "should." FM Saud told General Jones that we must reach out to tribal leaders and separate "those we could work with" from "those we must fight." He believed that using the military to fight extremists posed certain dangers, and that the credibility of the army must be maintained. The Saudis were pushing Pakistan's civilian leaders to work together, but "compromise seemed alien to Pakistani politicians." 6. (C) TURKI'S TAKE: During a recent meeting with Ambassador, former GIP Director Prince Turki Al-Faisal called Afghanistan a "puzzle," where establishing trust with Afghan leaders, and recognizing the links between Pakistan and the Taliban, were keys to success. All financial aid to the Afghan government should be conditional: benchmarks must be set for the leadership, and aid must be withheld until these are met. Recent Saudi efforts to assist in Taliban mediation had failed, he said, when "both sides fell short." He described the Taliban leadership as "fractured," and suggested the U.S. and NATO needed to target criminal elements more vociferously and re-focus our attention on capturing Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. He suggested Saudi Arabia, the U.S., China, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan could join forces and share assets in order to capture or kill bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri. This would break the terrorists' "aura of invincibility" and allow the U.S. to "declare victory" and move on. 7. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE: Terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern. Over the last year, however, Saudi Arabia has made important progress in combating al-Qaida financing emanating from the country. Sensitive reporting indicates that al-Qaida's ability to raise funds has deteriorated substantially, and that it is now in its weakest state since 9/11. The Kingdom is also cooperating more actively than at any previous point to respond to terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States, and to investigate and detain financial facilitators of concern. Nonetheless, sustained engagement is required to maintain the current momentum, particularly in providing the Saudis with specific details and actionable information. Your visit provides another opportunity to welcome the progress Saudi Arabia has made, and reiterate the importance that President Obama and the USG place on curtailing fundraising activity by global terrorist groups in Saudi Arabia, particularly those that undermine the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 8. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: While in the past the KSA stood reluctant to pursue Saudi donors who backed groups that did not directly threaten the Kingdom, the Saudi Ministry of Interior (MOI) has now demonstrated willingness to take action, and has begun to detain individuals involved in funding networks for groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), the Taliban, and in some cases even Hamas. xxxxxxxxxxxx as donors in Saudi Arabia continue to constitute a source of funding to Sunni extremist groups worldwide. Available intelligence reflects that the Kingdom remains an important fundraising locale-especially during the Hajj and Ramadan-for the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The MOI remains almost completely dependent on the CIA to provide analytic support and direction for its counterterrorism operations. As such, our success against terrorist financing in the Kingdom remains directly tied to our ability to provide actionable intelligence to our Saudi counterparts. In order to enhance the USG's ability to influence and direct Saudi efforts to Riyadh 00000182 003.2 of 003 disrupt terrorist financing, in 2008 we stood up a Treasury attach office in Embassy Riyadh. This office actively contributes to the daily intelligence sharing process that is led by CIA. 9. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: Saudi Arabia has taken increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt al-Qaida's access to funding from Saudi sources. An example of recent progress by the KSA is the conviction of over 300 people for involvement in terrorism, including some for providing financial support. News reports suggest that appeals may be opened to the media in order to enhance the deterrent effects of such prosecutions. In addition, Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs Mohammed bin Nayif stated that the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) deliberately timed its August 19, 2009 press release regarding the arrest of 44 terrorist supporters to deter potential donors from giving money to suspected terrorist groups during Ramadan. Although a great deal of work remains to be done, Mohammed bin Nayif has given his commitment to work with the United States on Taliban finance, and has said that the MOI will arrest individuals involved in Saudi-based Taliban fundraising activities - even if involved in the reconciliation process - when provided with actionable intelligence. 10. (S/NF) IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES: The Saudis have expressed broad support for the President's strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, but often balk when asked to designate an SRAP to coordinate policy with the USG and others. In part, this reflects the centralized Saudi decision-making process and the reality that issues related to Afghanistan and Pakistan policy are not delegated, but rather dealt with directly by the King and members of the intelligence community. While the Saudis are hesitant to delegate authority and tend to make only broad-based commitments to high-profile, multilateral initiatives, they appear ready, willing and eager to share their experiences with us and identify greater opportunities for cooperation on a bilateral basis. Your visit provides an opportunity to further explore how we can best translate our shared goals into action in the unique Saudi context.
S E C R E T STATE 083026 SENSITIVE SIPDIS RELEASABLE TO PAKISTAN EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019 TAGS EFIN, KTFN, PREL, PTER, UNSC SUBJECT: UN 1267 (AL-QAIDA/TALIBAN) SANCTIONS: USG OPPOSITION TO FOCAL POINT DE-LISTING REQUEST FOR JUD AND HAFIZ SAEED REF: STATE 65044 Classified By: IO Assistant Secretary Esther Brimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 4-6. ---------------------- SUMMARY AND OBJECTIVES ---------------------- 2. (SBU) In May 2009, legal representatives for 1267-listed entityJamaat-ud-Dawah (identified by the UN 1267 Committee as an alias forLashkar-e-Tayyiba, permanent reference number QE.L.118.05) and its leader,Muhammad Saeed (permanent reference number QI.S.263.08) petitioned on theirclients behalf for delisting via the UN focal point. The focal point, whichwas established in the UN Secretariat pursuant to UNSCR 1730 to allow listedindividuals/entities (or their representatives) to petition directly forde-listing, forwarded the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Saeed forreview to the USG (designating state) and to the Government of Pakistan(state of citizenship/residence/incorporation). The USG and GOP have had threemonths to review the de-listing petition. We have completed our review andplan to notify the UN focal point on August 25 of our opposition to de-listing.Before doing so, we would like to take this opportunity to: -- share the resultsof our review of the de-listing petition for JUD and Muhammad Saeed withPakistani officials; -- seek GOP views on the request; -- underscore our ongoingoncern over the threat posed by LeT/JUD and Saeed; -- ask Pakistani officials toupdate us on actions taken to impose UN 1267 sanctions on LeT/JUD and Saeed. ----------BACKGROUND ---------- 3. (S) On December 10, 2008, the UN 1267 Committee took several actions relatedto the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayibba (LeT), including its listing ofJamaat-ud-Dawah (JUD) as an alias for LeT, as well as the listing of JUDâ€™sleader, Muhammad Saeed. The Committee in 2005 added LeT to its Consolidated Listciting its affiliation with al-Qaida. The addition of the JUD alias, as well asthe listing of Saeed, followed closely on the heels of the LeT-perpetratedattacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008. Prior to the attacks, our request tolist JUD and Saeed were placed on hold by China at the behest of Pakistan. Inspite of Pakistani acquiescence to the listings in December 2008, we continue tosee reporting indicating that JUD is still operating in multiple locations inPakistan, and that the group continues to openly raise funds. It is unclear what,if any, steps the GOP has taken to freeze JUDâ€™s assets or otherwise implementUN 1267 sanctions, which include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- 4. (SBU) USUN is requested to inform the focal point on August 25, after bothUSUN and Islamabad have had a chance to inform Pakistani officials of our views,of our opposition to the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Muhammad Saeed.In its communication to the focal point, USUN should refute the assertion inSaeedâ€™s and his legal representatives claim in the focal point de-listingpetition that â€œthere are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on theConsolidated List and the material relied upon is incorrect and baselessâ€ andnote that we stand by the information included in the statements of case wesubmitted (co-sponsored by the UK and France) to the UN 1267 Committee to addJUD and Saeed to the Consolidated List. USUN should further state that we haveseen no evidence of a change in circumstance warranting de-listing of JUD orSaeed. 5. (SBU) USUN and Embassy Islamabad should inform Pakistani officials in NewYork and Islamabad, respectively, of our opposition to the de-listing petitionfor JUD and Saeed. Action addressees may wish to draw upon the following points: -- We have reviewed the de-listing petition from attorneys on behalf ofJamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed and will soon inform the UN1267 Committee, via the UN focal point, of our opposition to de-listing. -- We first wanted to share our views with Pakistani officials, and to seekPakistanâ€™s view on the de-listing petition. -- As you are no doubt aware, we are deeply concerned about the threat posed byLeT/JUD, and reject Saeedâ€™s and his legal representatives claim in the focalpoint de-listing petition that â€œthere are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUDon the Consolidated List and the material relied upon is incorrect and baseless.â€ -- In fact, LeT and JUD stem from the same original organization,Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI). When LeT was declared a terrorist organizationin Pakistan in 2002, MDI publicly divested itself of LeT at that time andrenamed itself JUD. LeT transferred most of its assets and personnel to thenewly formed JUD, ensuring its survival. -- We believe that LeT uses JUD facilities as a public front for its activitiesand shares offices, phone numbers, personnel and bank accounts. LeTâ€™s oldoffices merely changed the name on the door. -- JUDâ€™s budget, using funds from both witting and unwitting donors, isdedicated to social services and/or humanitarian relief but some is used tofinance LeT operations. -- We are also aware that LeT and JUD share many senior leaders, includingHafiz Saeed, who according to information available to the USG, as of 2009continued to control LeT and issue guidance to LeT members. -- We would like here your views on the status of LeT/JUD and Saeed, and wouldparticularly appreciate an update on steps Pakistan has taken or will take toimplement UN 1267 sanctions on them. 6. (S/REL to Pakistan) Embassy Islamabad is also requested to share anon-paper, included below in paragraph 7, prepared by our intelligencecommunity in February 2009 assessing JUDâ€™s links to LeT. This non-paper,which was previously passed by former S/CT Coordinator Dell Daily to PakistaniAmbassador to the United States Husain Haqqani, provides more detailedinformation on our concerns about LeT/JUD and Saeed that underpin our viewthat their listing by the UN 1267 Committee was and remains appropriate. 7. (S/REL to Pakistan) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER (U//FOUO) Assessing Jamaat-ud-Dawaâ€™s Links to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba SUMMARY (S//REL) The Community assesses that LT, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, usesthe JUD name as an alias. JUD is a religious, educational, and humanitarianorganization that the Community assesses provides cover and protection forLTâ€™s militant activities in Pakistan. LT and JUD share many senior leaders;LT falls under the authority of JUD leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed; and JUDsupports and facilitates LTâ€™s violent activities. - LT and JUD stem fromthe same original organization*Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI)*that was foundedaround 1986 and for which LT served as its armed, militant wing. MDI wasrenamed JUD in December 2001.- LT was declared a terrorist organization in January 2002, and MDI publiclydivested itself of the LT at that time. LT transferred most of its assets andpersonnel under the newly formed JUD. (S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD relies heavily on private donations,nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), madrassas, and businesses spreadthroughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some of the money tofinance LT operations is obtained by fraudulently redirecting donationsintended for humanitarian work. (S//REL) JUD and LT have branch offices with different names and have adopted anumber of aliases as a denial and deception tactic. END SUMMARY (C//REL) Various Names and Aliases (S//REL) The Intelligence Community assesses that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) andJamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are part of the same organization, originally calledMarkaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI), that was founded by Hafiz Muhammed Saeed andother faculty at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore in 1986.MDI was established with funding from donors in the Middle East and set up campsto prepare its personnel to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. MDI reorganized after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, creatingLT as its paramilitary wing to fight in the Indian-controlled districts ofJammu and Kashmir while MDI focused on religious and humanitarian activity.Saeed led both MDI and LT during the 1990s. When the US declared LT a terrorist organization in December 2001, MDIreorganized*changing its name to JUD to draw a distinction between itscharitable and educational work and LTâ€™s militant activities*in an effortby MDI leaders to shield their fundraising and other activities from sanctions.Saeed publicly resigned from LT, telling the media that he had assumed theleadership of JUD. In mid-January 2002, LT was banned. Islamabad â€œwatchlistedâ€ JUD in 2003, but the government has resistedpressure to take action against the group, particularly after JUD,s popularearthquake relief efforts in 2005 and 2006 in response to the October 2005earthquake in Pakistan. LT has used JUD facilities as a public front for its activities and, sharedoffices, phone numbers, leaders, and bank accounts. LT members identifiedthemselves as JUD when in Pakistan and as LT when in Kashmir. LT/JUD purportedly raises funds for the Palestinian people in response toIsraelâ€™s attacks on Gaza. The Community judges that as of January, JUD alsomay be operating under the alias Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool. LTâ€™s politicalaffairs coordinator Khalid Waleed identified himself in late December as thechief organizer for a conference for Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, according tointelligence reporting. - On 6 February, the JUD held a Kashmir SolidarityConference at which JUD renamed itself Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir (TAK). AtJUD,s first public protest since December, supporters used old JUD bannersand chanted JUD slogans, but rallied under the name TAK to avoid arrest. BEGIN TEXT BOX (U//FOUO) UN Links Jamaat-ud-Dawa to Terrorism (S//REL) The United Nations (UN) banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), and on 10December, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Al-Qaida and TalibanSanctions Committee (the 1267 Committee) approved the addition of JUD as anew LT alias for targeted sanctions. This UN designation required all UN memberstates to freeze any assets this entity may have under the member statesâ€™jurisdiction, Impose a travel ban, and implement an arms embargo against themas set out in paragraph 1 of UNSC Resolution 1822 of 2008. (S//REL) The Community assesses that LT/JUD, in an attempt to evaderestrictions, has established branch offices with different names and adopteda number of aliases. One branch, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, is a publiclyacknowledged charitable arm of JUD and has its own web page with photos ofhospitals and ambulances. Other aliases include Paasbaan-e-Ahle-Hadith,Paasban-e-Kashmir, Al-Mansoorian, and Al-Nasaryeen. We assess that LT andLT-associated militants will continue to use aliases in order to circumventrestrictions on their movement and operations. END TEXT BOX (U//FOUO) Financial Support (S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD fundraising has relied heavily onprivate donations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), madrassas, andbusinesses spread throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some ofJUDâ€™s budget, using funds raised both from witting donors and by fraud, isdedicated to social services or humanitarian relief projects, while some isused to finance LT operations. - In December 2005, an official of IdaraKhidmat-e-Khalq forwarded JUD donation receipts to a probable LT front companyin Saudi Arabia where an LT finance official may have been closely associatedwith the general manager*possibly acting as a front for moving LT funds,according to intelligence reporting. - Makki in 2002 frequently visited theMiddle East and viewed it as a main source of funding. To demonstrate resultsto donors, JUD would finance the cost of building a new school or upgradingfacilities at a madrassa, but would inflate the cost to siphon money to LT. (S//REL) The Community lacks sufficient intelligence to determine if or howthe November Mumbai attacks have affected donations to JUD. Some donors maybe dissuaded from supporting JUD if they become aware that their funds may beused for additional terrorist attacks, whereas other donors may support LTâ€™sattacks. As public and government scrutiny increases in the wake of the attacksand subsequent designation of JUD as an alias of LT by the UN, we assess thatJUD will rely more on covert fundraising efforts. (U//FOUO) Leadership (S//REL) The Community assesses that Saeed is the leader of LT and Lakvi isLTâ€™s operations commander*and they continue to run the organization despitebeing detained for their role in the November Mumbai attacks. We also judgethat they have planned, directed, and executed LT attacks throughout South Asiaand likely have used some funds collected in the name of JUDâ€™s charitableactivities to support multiple LT terrorist operations, including the NovemberMumbai attacks. The Community assesses that Saeed continues to lead bothorganizations.However, the Community is unable to assess to what extent senior JUD leaderssuch as Saeed are involved in specific terrorist operations or the level ofdetail to which they are knowledgeable about specific past and pending attacks.- As of mid-July Lakvi was responsible for the LTâ€™s military operations budgetof PKR 365 million (approximately US $5.2 million) per year. He reportedly usedthe money to purchase all materials required for LT operations other thanweapons and ammunition, according to a source claiming direct and ongoingaccess to LT leaders. END TEXT OF NON-PAPER--------------------------------------- REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINT OF CONTACT --------------------------------------- 8. (U) Action addressees should report as soon as possible but no later thanAugust 19 results of their demarche to Pakistani officials . 9. (U) Questions may be directed to IO/PSC (Erin Crowe, 202-736-7847). CLINTON